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Many researchers in different disciplines have independently concluded that brains are,
possibly among other things, vector processing devices. In this paper we offer support for
this hypothesis coming from a new perspective. Namely, we test it against some known
anomalies in the processing by schizophrenic patients of certain logical tasks: they perform
better at them than normal controls, despite the observation that they do not generally
employ “normal” or “commonsense” logic. On the assumption that they are compelled to
use the intrinsic logic of the brain instead of commonsense logic, and that this logic is
linear or quantum-like, we are able to resolve these and other anomalies. Our conclusions
support the idea that human brains (at least) perform intrinsic logical operations according
to the dictates of a linear (or Grassmannian, or quantum-like) logic rather than “classical”
or Aristotelian logic (which seems not to be intrinsic to brains, these having evolved under
the pressure of different constraints). If this is the case, then commonsense logic must
be acquired through experience and the construction of contexts, an ability schizophrenic
patients seem to lack, and who are consequently compelled to rely on the intrinsic logic,
which is quantum-like and more eﬃcient at certain tasks. Moreover, the proclivity toward
errors of von Domarus type (namely the inference that shared attributes imply identity),
which seems to be endemic to human thinking and has been discussed in connection with
schizophrenia, is also explained on this basis.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many researchers in such ﬁelds as computational neurology, neurobiology, and theories of cognition, have independently
concluded that brains are linear vector processing devices [14,15,29]. Still other workers have found remarkable quantum-
like effects in certain related cognitive contexts, including such exotic phenomena as entanglement [2,5,44]. Of course, these
two classes of hypothesis are not independent since the logic concomitant upon the assumption of the linear processing of
vectors is exactly the logic of vector space lattices, and this is essentially what quantum logic is, having been discovered
in the nineteenth century in a purely mathematical context by H. Grassmann [23] (and famously misunderstood by his
contemporaries). Indeed, it should be noted that it is not supposed that actual fundamental quantum physics underlies
these phenomena (except insofar as quantum physics underlies all phenomena) but, rather, that a similar sort of logic seems
to have been neurologically effected, presumably through the vagaries of evolution: a logic, moreover, which is peculiarly
eﬃcient at certain tasks when compared to the use of ordinary commonsense logic by normal controls.
It is the aim of the present paper to provide support for this hypothesis by using it to attempt to resolve a puzzle in the
observed logical functioning of schizophrenic patients, who outperform normal controls at certain tasks, despite the use of
a logic that differs from, and seems to be at odds with, the ordinary everyday logic used by normal controls. We shall argue
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on the intrinsic logic “down below” (cf. [5]), and that if this logic is linear (i.e. quantum-like) then the puzzle is resolved.
Moreover, and perhaps more signiﬁcantly supporting the hypothesis that this is indeed the logic of down below, we explain
the appearance of the von Domarus principle, which emerges as a consequence of the adoption of this logic.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe some aspects of the logic processing observed in
schizophrenic thought, compare it to the behavior exhibited by normal controls, and describe two of the logical tests at
which such patients anomalously outperform normal controls, despite the apparent abnormality of the logic they employ.
Since they do employ a logic, which is sometimes more eﬃcient than “normal” logic, where does this logic come from
and how may it be described? In Section 3 we follow up the suggestion that this logic comes from down below, and is
essentially some fragmentary form of a vector space lattice-like logic (i.e. quantum-like) as suggested in the works already
cited. We continue in this section to recall technical results (without proofs) concerning the most general such logic, namely
orthologic, and its representation in terms of Kripkean models. These results are used to derive a possible resolution of the
second anomaly of Section 2 on the assumption that this is the logic schizophrenic patients are compelled to use having no
other recourse. In a ﬁnal section we very brieﬂy propose a more general logic (in the form of a Gentzen sequent calculus)
which in a sense externalizes the intuitionistic fragment of orthologic in the presence of massive quantum-like entangle-
ment. The latter phenomenon is suggested in Section 2.2 as the mechanism behind context formation. We hypothesize that
this overarching logic (to be derived from ﬁrst principles elsewhere) lies close to the actual logic of “normal” human rea-
soning. By way of support for this hypothesis we show how its intrinsic set theory gives rise to a mechanism explaining the
ubiquitous presence of the von Domarus principle.
2. Characteristic features of the logic of schizophrenic patients
In this section we give a brief account of features of thought pertaining to the handling of logic, in particular to the
puzzling capacity of schizophrenic patients to outperform normals on certain logical tests.
2.1. General context blindness
Schizophrenics seem to be unable to take general contexts into account, where by context we mean, somewhat informally,
any pre-existing or already established aggregates of related states of affairs or data, either of external origin or generated
by internal processes or prior steps of reasoning. A range of performance problems implicating “context” have been reported
in schizophrenia across decades of experimental work [6,21,22]. Insofar as “commonsense” provides a logical context (or set
of commonly agreed upon “axioms”) it is likely to be rejected, or not found convincing, by schizophrenic thinkers. They
seem to reject commonsense notions—the “idols of the tribe” as Francis Bacon put it. Rather, they seem to adopt different,
possibly private, axioms, or theses, and then construct their logical worlds on such bases. See for example [36], vignette 2:
“. . . Facts are not self-evident . . . ”; and [27]. Also [37]: the “axioms of everyday life” are not evident. This constructivist
tendency is very similar to that adopted by practitioners of intuitionistic logic. Similarly, there seems to be an intolerance
toward the need to synchronize repetitive actions ([4], Clinical Case 2) and general sequential information [45]. Presumably,
this is an aspect of the general blindness to context, the context in this case being provided by the stored or remembered
results of prior processing: thus there may be a failure of such storage mechanisms [27]. (Please also see Section 2.2.)
This problem with contexts seems to invade even the perceptual ﬁeld in some cases, leading to the phenomenon of
fragmentation: cf. [31], p. 49: “Objects normally seen as parts of larger complexes may seem strangely isolated, disconnected
from each other and devoid of encompassing context; . . . ” A patient draws a bowl of fruit in which each piece is seen in
isolation, ﬂoating like a cloud above the bowl, “separated from one another and their overall context.” (See also [3,40].)
Several experimental studies have found schizophrenics to be faster in detecting targets than control groups in cases where
the conﬁgural arrangement of targets and distractors hindered the performance of the control group [41].
Finally, if we allow an appreciation of realistic probabilistic event sets, these probabilities would provide a context in
which to draw logical conclusions. Blindness to, or intolerance of, these contexts would lead to “jumping to conclusions” on
the basis of inadequate sampling of events and this is also well documented [11].
2.2. Context formation: a digression
In this paper it will suﬃce to subscribe to an informal view of the notion of context though it should be remarked
that a workable model of context formation (and context distraction) will be afforded by the overarching logic to be de-
scribed brieﬂy in Section 4 and developed elsewhere. Essentially, this view of context formation/distraction will instantiate
in terms of quantum entanglement. Storage in quantum-like systems is effected by means of this kind of entanglement and
this should have testable consequences for schizophrenic memory and lexical functions, since entanglement is presumably
suppressed in these patients.
Since this sort of entanglement is presumably the norm, schizophrenic patients must ﬁnd other ways to aggregate con-
cepts, objects, etc. Just such a mechanism is inherent in the logic and is described in Section 4.
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This departure from “normal” categorization would necessarily entail an associated logic that is different from the
logic associated with ordinary set theory, namely ordinary propositional logic. And indeed, the kind of logic employed
by schizophrenic patients often involves the identiﬁcation of entities sharing abstract and seemingly useless attributes. von
Domarus reported upon how a schizophrenic identiﬁed an Indian and a stag because of their attribute of “swiftness” and
how another took the encirclement of a cigar by a band, the encirclement of a woman by the sexual glances of a man and
the encirclement of Jesus by a halo to identify cigar, woman and Jesus [42]. This propensity was elevated into a principle
by von Domarus (see [3]) but experiment has shown that this does not overtly characterize schizophrenic thinking per se
[43,26] when the attributes two entities share are any old attributes. It may be that attributes have to be prototypical or
“essential” as in e.g. von Domarus’ examples of “swiftness” and “encirclement.” Thus, in case histories going back to Bleuler,
a patient who abhors war learns that Switzerland also abhors war and therefore identiﬁes himself with that country [3].
“Abhorring war” being an essential attribute of the patient and a country and leading the patient to an identiﬁcation of two
different things which we mark as “delusional.” Similarly, a patient identiﬁes a pen with a shoe because they both leave
traces ([31], pp. 126 and 457 (note 30)). “Leaving a trace” being, again, a prototypical attribute of a shoe and a pen.
It is possible, and we shall argue, likely, that this “principle” is inherent in human thinking but that schizophrenics and
others may be less able to resist its blandishments. This will be borne out by the logical structure that emerges in Section 4.
When the prototypical or essential properties become dominant (as in the schizophrenic case) then the merely similar are
taken to be identical. This may lie at the heart of the syndrome of “delusional misidentiﬁcation”—often regarded as speciﬁc
to schizophrenia but also seen in right cerebral hemisphere damage [7,10].
Clearly, belief in such propositions is at odds with “normal,” ordinary, Aristotelian logic: for one thing, the classical
principle of excluded middle, or tertium non datur—namely the principle that a proposition (p, say) is either true or false
(i.e. p OR (NOT p) or p ∨ ¬p in symbols)—must be suspended. For, conﬂicting properties may obtain among entities forced
into coalescence by this failure to normally abstract set-like properties. I am a man and also Switzerland, which is not a
man. Thus, I am a man and also not a man. Consequently I must accept the truth of statements of the form p AND (NOT p)
(p ∧ ¬p) which is the negation of excluded middle (¬p ∨ p). We note here that there is a signiﬁcant and very well-known
version of standard logic, namely intuitionistic logic (IL), that also does not adhere to the law of excluded middle, and, as
we shall argue in a sequel, shares other attributes with the logic of schizophrenia.
This general inability to form sets (or classes) because the normal ability to abstract properties is somehow subverted
(or possibly enhanced beyond the normal range), has deep ramiﬁcations for the logic. Ordinary set theory and its associated
logic, namely ordinary propositional calculus, must be abandoned.
2.4. The logic in action: a case for modus ponens in the logic of schizophrenia
A case can be made for the correct use of modus ponens in the thinking of schizophrenic patients. For instance, in the
ﬁrst case history in [4] a female patient proves (“to other people who did not believe her”) that she is the Virgin Mary as
follows. First she walks up and down the median of a heavily traﬃcked road for a while, and survives. From this she jumps
to the conclusion (on the basis of inadequate sampling) that she is unkillable. From the axiom (or rather her axiom) that
unkillability implies supernaturality she concludes, via a correct application of modus ponens, that she is supernatural. But
the Virgin Mary is also (prototypically) supernatural and so, by the von Domarus principle, the patient is the Virgin Mary.
QED.
Other case histories can be analyzed similarly.
(It is possible, in this and other cases, that the subject is convinced of this identity before sampling the traﬃc, and so
there is a sort of anticipation of a preconceived result. This sort of preconception would be inherent in all applications of
the von Domarus principle prior to which choices are made, or unconsciously induced, among the possible prototypical or
essential attributes upon which the identiﬁcation is based, and bears upon the abnormality of the abstractive process. None
of these considerations enter into the functioning of the logic itself however. This will be borne out by our model, from
which a version of the von Domarus principle explicitly emerges as a side effect. Cf. Section 4.)
2.5. The ﬁrst anomaly
We brieﬂy review the ﬁndings reported in [28]. Two sorts of syllogism were designed. The ﬁrst sort, labeled “non-
commonsense” (NCS), involved propositions that were not “commonsensical” though the conclusions were logically valid.
For example:
All buildings speak loudly;
a hospital does not speak loudly;
therefore, a hospital is not a building.
This is of type modus tollens:
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¬(a hospital speaks loudly) ⇒ ¬(a hospital is a building)
and is logically valid, though of course the propositions are not commonsensical.
The second sort involved commonsense propositions but the conclusions were logically invalid: these are labeled CS. For
example:
If the sun rises, then the sun is in the east;
the sun is in the east;
therefore, the sun rises.
The ﬁrst two sentences are of the form p ⇒ q; q from which p does not follow.
The participants were asked to accept the ﬁrst two sentences as true, and then to decide the truth or falsity of the third
sentence. In view of the remarks in the preceding subsections, the authors predicted that schizophrenic patients would
outperform normal controls, who would be subject to context distraction—by the conﬂicts between the context provided by
“commonsense” and that of the non-commonsensical propositions (speciﬁcally the conclusions) used—in the NCS cases, and
by the presence of context conﬁrming (though logically invalid) “conclusions” in the CS cases.
The results reported conﬁrm this prediction: healthy volunteers succeed with only 40% of the syllogisms with
schizophrenic patients doing signiﬁcantly better.
From this we may conclude, with the authors, that schizophrenic patients are either better at certain logical tasks, or are
worse at commonsense, or both. In any of these cases, it is certain that they do in fact wield a logic, and that this logic is
capable of correctly judging modus tollens arguments (in addition to those involving modus ponens), and also prevents them
from falling into the trap of concluding p from p ⇒ q and q, just because p ﬁts into the context provided by commonsense.
2.6. The second anomaly
Here we brieﬂy review the results of another reasoning task, regarded by the authors as “demanding” [27]. In this task
participants were provided with an array of twelve variously colored geometric shapes (the context): circles, diamonds,
squares and triangles. The task is to verify a certain conditional rule, or implication, by choosing an example which counters
the rule. An easy conditional would be one of the form:
If there is a red square on the left, then there is not a yellow circle on the right.
The “heuristic” to counter this rule would be to keep the antecedent and counter the consequent. Thus a possible correct
response would be to juxtapose a red square on the left with a yellow circle on the right. It has been established that
almost all normal subjects perform this task correctly. However things are found to be very different when the negation
appears in the antecedent, so that the conditional is now of the form:
If there is not a red square on the left, then there is a yellow circle on the right.
This task is failed by 90% of healthy subjects who in this case seem again to fall into a trap triggered by the presence of
the context, and tend to effectively miss the negation sign in the course of applying the heuristic in which the antecedent
is kept. Schizophrenic patients fare signiﬁcantly better at this task.
In Section 3.4 we shall analyze this ﬁnding on the assumption that the logic employed by schizophrenic patients is
quantum-like, whose negation operation is different from normal negation, and which, in this case, allows them to correctly
confute the rule in a context-avoiding manner.
2.7. The logic of “normalcy”
It is of course an open and much discussed question what form of logic it is that is actually practiced by normals, though
it is clearly not the same as that employed by schizophrenic patients. For the purposes of logical argument in this paper
we shall assume that in the limited domain of pure deduction, normal logic resembles a variant of Boolean propositional
calculus (PC), whose central position in human thinking is presumably a development from this, ex post facto. However, its
actual use (by non-logicians) seems to be prone to certain well-attested errors which seem to be largely context driven. In
addition to the logical errors discussed above, there are other errors of “bias” and “heuristics,” such as the conjunctive fallacy:
this refers to the tendency to ascribe a higher probability to a conjunction of circumstances than to either circumstance in
isolation. An explanation is that the thinker retains a bias toward one of them—the erroneous one—because of the context
built into the question, which is irrelevant to the probability outcome. The classical example is from [39]:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues
of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
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1. Linda is a bank teller.
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
85% of those asked chose option 2. The authors ascribe this error to the use of what they call the “representativeness
heuristic,” meaning that Linda is described in a certain context in the question itself, and this propels the thinker to choose
the second option since the description there is consistent with this context. (For a modern take on this see [16].) What
evidence there is seems to support the hypothesis that here again schizophrenic patients tend to avoid this fallacy slightly
more often than do normals, presumably because of their context blindness [24].
So the double-edged sword of normalcy, so far as logic is concerned, is that normals develop a working logic through
the acquisition of heuristic rules and other context forming processes, but that this very context forming proclivity tends to
distract them from—or interfere with—their performance of certain logical tasks.
Context blind schizophrenic thinkers, on the other hand, lack this logic, but at the same time tend to avoid the errors of
context distraction.
Thus we are left with the question that motivates this discussion: if schizophrenic patients lack “normal” logic, what sort
of logic do they have?
(In a sequel to this paper we shall investigate a model of reasoning based on the logic to be described in Section 4 which
yields an account of context formation/distraction as well as forms of deduction.)
3. Orthologic and quantum logic
From the preceding it seems clear that schizophrenic patients use a form of logic that differs crucially from “normal”
logic. It tolerates the failure of tertium non datur and seems to avoid learned heuristics and contextual biases while preserving
correct usages of modus ponens and modus tollens. It is, on the other hand, prone to von Domarus errors and any set-making
capabilities associated with it seem to be bizarrely different from normal ones. It seems that logic as practiced by normals is
rather dependent upon heuristics, biases, and context, which may be part and parcel of the logic, learnt through experience
as the environment is negotiated. These rules, heuristics, etc., generally seem to embody formally correct logical inferences,
though they are prone to context related errors. Context blind schizophrenic patients are much less prone to such errors
and presumably derive their logic in a manner devoid of contextual cues.
We shall assume that they in fact derive their logic from—where else?—some innate neuronal organization, and moreover
that this logic reﬂects an underlying vector processing structure, as hypothesized by the authors cited above.
In this section we shall give a brief account (without proofs) of a range of logics related to this logic, and their mod-
els. These primitive models already betray certain quantum-like properties, such as superposition, even in the absence of
anything remotely like quantum physics itself, and are useful for purposes of comparison with ordinary propositional logic.
3.1. Orthologic
We shall ultimately present arguments supporting the hypothesis that the logic of schizophrenia is quantum-like, and
put forward the hypothesis that “normal” logic differs from it in that massive entanglement is present in an externalized
version of the logic (an hypothesis to be investigated elsewhere). In this section we summarize certain technical aspects of
quantum-like logic.
The essential difference between ordinary propositional logic (PC, hereafter) and the logic associated with the lattice of
subspaces of a vector space is that the law of distribution of conjunction over disjunction fails to hold in the latter logic.
This has the eventual semantic import that disjunction is not truth-functional: it will be possible for a disjunction to be
valid while neither of its component propositions are. (This is one of the keys to the disquiet felt by classical thinkers when
confronted by quantum mechanics: in the famous double slit experiment, for example, “(electron Fred passed through slit 1)
OR (electron Fred passed through slit 2)” can be true, while neither “electron Fred passed through slit 1” nor “electron Fred
passed through slit 2” is true, to put it crudely.)
The most general such logic, called orthologic, (hereafter OL) was completely characterized in a series of works by Gold-
blatt [18,19] who was also the ﬁrst to present (ﬁrst order) OL in the form of a deductive system, as follows.
The primitive symbols or atoms comprise:
(i) a denumerable collection Φ0 of propositional variables a1,a2, . . . ;
(ii) the connectives ∼ (“negation”) and  (“conjunction”);
(iii) parentheses.
The set Φ of well-formed formulae is constructed from these in the usual way. Elements of Φ will be denoted by lower
case Greek characters α,β, . . . . Since there is no implication sign in Φ a formal deductive calculus is based on the notion
of a (binary) sequent. This is an expression of the form
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the intended reading of which is that β may be inferred from α.
Certain sequents are designated axioms, and there are three rules of inference, namely, for any formulae α, β,γ :
Axioms
O1. α  α
O2. α  β  α
O3. α  β  β
O4. α ∼∼ α
O5. ∼∼ α  α
O6. α ∼ α  β
Inference Rules
O7.
α  β β  γ
α  γ
O8.
α  β α  γ
α  β  γ
O9.
α  β
∼ β ∼ α
A disjunctive connective may be introduced via the deﬁnition
α unionsq β :=∼((∼ α)  (∼ β)) (3.2)
and dual forms of O2, O3, O6 and O8 follow.
A string s1; s2; . . . ; sn of sequents is called a proof of its last member sn if each si is either an axiom or follows from
some preceding sequents through the use of one of the rules of inference. If there exists a proof of a sequent α  β we
write
α O β (3.3)
and say that β is deducible from α in OL.
If α O β for any formula α, we say that β is a theorem of OL or an orthotheorem, and write
O β. (3.4)
We recall that there are completeness theorems for PC and intuitionistic logic, IL, which assert connections between
the analogous forms of deducibility in those logics and the behavior of morphisms, or evaluations, of formulae into cer-
tain classes of lattices: Boolean algebras in the case of PC and Heyting algebras in the case of IL. There is an analogous
characterization of OL, involving a class of lattices called ortholattices.
An ortholattice is a bounded lattice 〈L,unionsq,,0L,1L,′ 〉 where ( )′ is a unary operation called orthocomplementation satisfy-
ing:
complementarity: for all a ∈ L, a  a′ = 0L , a unionsq a′ = 1L
unitarity: a′′ = a
antitonicity: a  b iff b′  a′
It can be easily shown that the De Morgan law holds in such a lattice: (a unionsq b)′ = a′  b′ .
Examples include all Boolean algebras and lattices of closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces.
Given an ortholattice L, a function vL : Φ0 → L determines a valuation upon Φ via the recursive deﬁnitions
vL(α  β) = vL(α)  vL(β), (3.5)
vL(∼ α) = vL(α)′. (3.6)
The algebraic characterization theorem for OL may be stated as follows.
Theorem 3.1. (See [19].) γ O α iff vL(γ )  vL(α) for all ortholattices L and all valuations vL .
Corollary 3.1. O α iff vL(α) = 1L for all ortholattices L and all valuations vL .
Since Boolean algebras are ortholattices we immediately have the following:
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the converse clearly being false.
3.2. Kripke orthomodels
Kripke models for OL seem to have appeared ﬁrst in [19] and have been extensively elaborated upon by others [8,30,33].
(In particular, many of the proofs required for our treatment here may be found in [30] or [33].)
The Stone representation theorem for Boolean algebras, which realizes any Boolean algebra as a sublattice of the lattice
of subsets of a set, could be used to open the way to developing a theory of Kripke frames for PC, since in view of it we
could restrict the lattices in the characterization theorem for PC to lattices of subsets of sets, and then the path to the
corresponding Kripke frames would be clear. (Recall that a Kripke frame is a pair 〈W , R〉, where W is a set (of “worlds”)
and R ⊆ W × W is a binary relation (“accessibility”).) However, there is no point in doing this since these frames would be
trivial—sets, with merely the identity of elements as the accessibility relation—and nothing is gained semantically.
This is not the case for OL. The corresponding Kripke frames have a non-trivial accessibility relation whose semantics
gives a good account of such subtleties as superposition in the quantum sense, without having to invoke the complex
trappings of quantum physics proper. (In particular, one may discuss quantum computational issues on a purely logical
basis: cf. [30].)
First we require a theorem of Stonean type for ortholattices which was provided by Goldblatt. Some preliminaries are
required. An orthogonality space F := 〈W ,⊥〉 comprises a set W and a binary relation ⊥ ⊆ W ×W which is an orthogonality:
namely, it is irreﬂexive (x /⊥ x) and symmetric (x⊥y iff y⊥x). For x ∈ W , Y ⊆ W we write x⊥Y iff x⊥y for all y ∈ Y and
deﬁne
Y⊥ := {x: x⊥Y }. (3.7)
In the terminology of [18] Y ⊆ W is said to be regular if
Y⊥⊥ = Y . (3.8)
Then the class R(F ) of regular subsets of W is a (complete) ortholattice under the partial order given by set inclusion,
the meet being given by set intersection and with ⊥ as orthocomplement. This class of examples is canonical in view of
Goldblatt’s fundamental theorem for ortholattices:
Theorem 3.2 (Goldblatt’s Stonean Theorem). (See [18].) Any ortholattice is (completely) isomorphic to a subortholattice of R(FL) for
some orthogonality space FL .
Since the construction involved can be used to motivate the Kripke models that ensue, we shall brieﬂy describe it. For a
given ortholattice L, let FL = 〈WL,⊥L〉, where WL is the class of proper ﬁlters of L, and, for x, y ∈ WL , x⊥L y iff there exists
an a ∈ L such that a′ ∈ x and a ∈ y. (A proper ﬁlter of L is an upward closed subset of L, closed also under ﬁnite meets,
which does not contain 0L .) The map φ : L → 2WL (the set of subsets of WL ) given, for a ∈ L, by φ(a) = {x ∈ WL: a ∈ x},
embeds L into R(FL) and its image is characterized in [18]. In case L is complete, φ is surjective.
Now, a proper ﬁlter is like a “possible world” which “validates” each of its members: if the membership of a in x is
construed as “a is true in world x,” then everything that can be inferred from a should also be true in the world x, which is
the case if x is a ﬁlter and  is read as a form of implication. Under this reading, each φ(a), being a set of possible worlds,
could be interpreted as a proposition asserting the truth of a in a certain set of possible worlds. These considerations lead
to a class of models that also characterize OL but carry a rather more interesting semantic interpretation, as follows.
A proximity space is a pair 〈W ,≈〉 in which W is a set and “≈” is a binary relation on it which is reﬂexive (w ≈ w) and
symmetric (v ≈ w iff w ≈ v). Clearly, each proximity space 〈W ,≈〉 determines an orthogonality space 〈W ,⊥〉 where v⊥w
iff v ≈ w , and, conversely, each orthogonality space 〈W ,⊥〉 determines a proximity space 〈W ,≈〉 where v ≈ w iff v /⊥ w .
A Kripke orthomodelM= 〈W ,≈,〉 is a proximity space 〈W ,≈〉 and a function (called a valuation)  : Φ → R(〈W ,⊥〉)
satisfying:
(α  β) = (α) ∩ (β), (3.9)
(∼ α) = (α)⊥. (3.10)
Given a Kripke orthomodelM= 〈W ,≈,〉 we will say that a formula α is:
true on a set E ⊆ W , and write E M α, iff E ⊆ (α);
true in the Kripke orthomodelM iff W M α.
A formula α is said to be Kripke valid, and we write  α, iff it is true in all Kripke orthomodels. Then, using the Goldblatt
Stonean theorem, it is not hard to prove the following
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Note that PC is just the logic supported by the family of Kripke orthomodels in which the proximity relation is just
“=”: identity of elements. Consequently, we can think of the replacement of “=” by “≈” in some generic Kripke ortho-
model as “quantization” and explore the differences. This was done in [30] to logically analyze notions of parallelism via
superposition—which is just disjunction in this logic—in quantum computation. (See also [33].) In Section 3.4 we shall use
it to analyze the differences between the semantic readings of negation in PC and negation in OL in an attempt to resolve
the second anomaly above (Section 2.6).
(At this juncture it is worth remarking that a properly modal interpretation of OL is quite near the surface, upon noting
that proximity spaces are exactly the Kripke frames for that normal modal system dubbed “Brouwersche” and due to
O. Becker (circa 1930). In fact, for each formula α of Φ there is a translation α◦ into a formula of the B-modal system
such that α is a theorem of OL iff α◦ is a theorem of the B-modal system. This seems to have been discovered at about the
same time by Goldblatt [19] and Dishkant: see the sources already cited. For simpliﬁed proofs see also [30] or [33]. This
representation of OL is also useful in the logical analysis of quantum computation but we shall not need it here.)
3.3. Quantum logic proper
The Kripke frames that arise in the physics of quantum systems are of the following type. Let H denote a Hilbert space
with inner product 〈 | 〉. Then, with h denoting the non-zero elements of H and taking ξ⊥η iff 〈ξ |η〉 = 0 for ξ,η ∈ h, 〈h,⊥〉
is an orthogonality space. Since, for a given subset E of h, the smallest closed subspace of H containing E , denoted [E],
is just E⊥⊥ ∪ {0} it is clear that the regular subsets of 〈h, ⊥〉 are exactly the closed subspaces of H with 0 removed, and
that the assignment P → [P ] of regular subsets of 〈h, ⊥〉 to closed subspaces of H is a bijection preserving the respective
ortholattice structures. The logic determined by this class of (so-called Hilbert) lattices is what is usually referred to as
quantum logic, though prior to 1981 this term referred to a more general logic, namely that logic determined by the class of
orthomodular lattices, to which Hilbert lattices belong, which, among other characterizations, are those ortholattices having
the property that if a  b, then the smallest subortholattice containing a and b is distributive (i.e. Boolean). (Orthomodular
lattices were found to be too general a class of models thanks to an example discovered by Greechie in 1981. A brief account
of these matters may be found in [33] in addition to the standard references. A radical modern treatment of the subject is
to be found in [9].)
These orthomodular logics have various pathologies relative to the behavior of other sorts of logic: they lack a well-
behaved implication connective, lack constructive or dynamic features, and are deeply intractable, as Goldblatt stunningly
demonstrated in [20]. Speciﬁcally, although Kripkean models of OL can be extended to accommodate a characterization
of orthomodular logic, there is no ﬁrst order characterization of the orthomodularity condition for orthoframes. This has
the consequence that the traditional method of proving that the relevant class of Kripke frames characterizes the logic—
namely by showing that the canonical frame belongs to the class—fails for orthomodular logic. That is, this method fails
to determine a class of orthoframes which characterize orthomodular logic. The orthomodular condition somehow causes
orthomodular logic to escape the conﬁnes of this classically designed trap.
For these reasons it behooves us to ﬁnd another version of this logic better able to handle computational issues and this
was the program begun in [33] (see [34] for an abbreviated account), and continued in [35]. In Section 4 we will brieﬂy
describe this development and its relevance to the possible set-making schemata of users of such logics.
3.4. Kripke orthoframes and the second anomaly
We shall investigate the second anomaly of Section 2.6 in the context of Kripke orthoframes, which provide models of
both OL and PC, as we have noted. First we shall adopt the terminology of [8] and now refer to the elements of the lattices
R(〈W ,⊥〉) as propositions. Let us choose some generic Kripke orthoframe, namely a proximity space 〈W ,≈〉, and consider
its simplest available propositions, namely those arising from single “worlds,” or states, as elements of W are more properly
called in this context. For any E ⊆ W , the smallest proposition containing E is E⊥⊥ . (Note that: E ⊆ E⊥⊥ , and that E ⊆ F
implies F⊥ ⊆ E⊥ , and also that E⊥⊥⊥ = E⊥ . Cf. [30] or [33].) Thus the simplest propositions are those of the form
p = {w}⊥⊥, w ∈ W . (3.11)
The negation of this proposition is the proposition
p⊥ = {w}⊥
= {v ∈ W : v ≈ w}. (3.12)
Deﬁning the proximal or similarity sphere around w by
Sw := {v ∈ W : v ≈ w} (3.13)
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p⊥ = W \ Sw . (3.14)
In case it be supposed that the logic was “classical,” i.e. PC, then the “≈” would reduce to “=” and p⊥ would reduce to
the “normal” negation of p, namely the PC proposition
pc := W \ {w}. (3.15)
Now Sw is generally very much larger than {w} so p⊥ is generally very much smaller than pc . Consequently, a wielder
of OL would have an easier time searching for a state fulﬁlling “not p”. Other issues are more pointedly brought to the fore
when we use a Hilbert lattice based proximity space, as can be seen on returning to the second anomaly.
Here we may set up two orthogonal real axes indexing the attributes color and shape. Thus we have a two dimensional
(real) Hilbert space and the vectors (red, square), (yellow, circle), etc., represent generators of propositions, which are one
dimensional subspaces, or lines through the origin (with this origin removed), containing the corresponding vector. So, for
instance, to search for an example of a state representing “not a red square” the OL user need only select a point (or non-
zero vector) in the subspace, or line, orthogonal to the vector (red, square), regardless of the context (the rest of the space),
a vastly smaller search space (of Lebesgue measure zero) than that confronting the PC user, and one not prone to confusion
with the original vector, which is orthogonal to the search space.
A context distracted user of PC, on the other hand, given his or her vastly larger search space, namely the set-theoretic
complement of the singleton set {(red, square)} (of inﬁnite Lebesgue measure), may in (entangled) distraction tend to choose
something so close to the original vector as to be confusable with it, thus effectively losing sight of the negation.
(In a sequel this conclusion will emerge as a formal consequence of the logic to be described in the next section.)
4. Quantum set theory, linear logic and the von Domarus principle
A version of linearized set theory, in which subsets of a set correspond to subspaces of a vector space, was recognized
by Grassmann at the outset of his development of “extension theory” (cf. [23]). These ideas were elaborated into a fully
ﬂedged quantum set theory by Finkelstein [12]: see also [33]. To fully appreciate how this version of set theory ﬁts into
(and forms an integral part of) OL and its descendants requires going beyond their computationally sterile conﬁnes, a topic
we digress brieﬂy to discuss.
Standard quantum logic has been found wanting as a deductive system even with the addition of orthomodularity, since,
among other pathologies, it is intrinsically non-constructive, a failing it shares with PC. In the latter case, the historical
path to a more expressive deductive logic led, through the development of (intuitionistic) proof theoretic systems, to type
theories and beyond. In [33] (see also [34]) a resource sensitive version of the intuitionistic fragment of the core logic OL
was put forward and developed into a tool to investigate certain aspects of physics and quantum computation [34,35]. For
the purposes of the present discussion, we need only mention brieﬂy the primary results. The Gentzen sequent calculus that
emerged from that analysis (called there GQ) turns out to be a fragment of a version of intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) that is
self-dual: that is, the connectives usually written as ⊕ (a form of disjunction) and ⊗ (a form of conjunction) coincide with
their duals. (For a sample of the vast literature on linear logic we offer [1,17,32,38] and their references.) The intuitionistic
version of OL (called IOL in [34] and [35]) is obtained by discarding the intuitionistically invalid axioms—namely O5 and
O6, the latter axiom being essentially tertium non datur—and adding new ones for the disjunctive connective, since the De
Morgan law does not hold intuitionistically. (Note that IOL shares certain properties with “schizophrenic” logic: namely,
it allows modus ponens (O7) and modus tollens (O9), but renounces tertium non datur (O6).) Then there is a translation of
IOL formulae α into GQ formulae αe such that α IOL β implies !αe GQ βe , in an obvious notation, where ! denotes the
Girard of course operator. (Even without any prior hypothesis of an underlying quantum-like structure, an argument could
be made for a linear-like logic computationally underpinning human logic, and this will be considered elsewhere.) This
sequent calculus represents a kind of externalization of the logic we have labeled IOL, whose types may be realized as
(real Hilbert) spaces. These are subject to massive entanglement among themselves via the realization of the conjunctive
operator ⊗ as the tensor product in the category of Hilbert spaces. The logic of schizophrenics on the other hand, who are
presumably denied access to the machinery of context formation, i.e. entanglement, must therefore be closer to the logic
of single, isolated, unentangled instances of Hilbert space, whose types are the closed subspaces of a ﬁxed space, namely
that logic based on OL: indeed, IOL seems a likely candidate, as we have argued above. These logics are not independent,
since IOL sequents (and indeed also PC propositions) may be translated into ILL sequents as mentioned above, a translation
which will allow connections between the various logics to be established. Note that the of course operator ! plays a crucial
role in this embedding.
There are various categories in which this calculus may be realized but there is really only one of interest to us here:
namely the category of ﬁnite dimensional (real) Hilbert spaces. In this category the exterior algebra functor E( ) (see below)
realizes the of course operator !( ). Thus, the exterior algebra of Grassmann occupies a central position in this realization of
the minimal sequent calculus extension of IOL. We shall return to this calculus in more detail elsewhere, but turn now to
the set theoretical attributes of the exterior algebra and their relevance to the topic at hand. (Note that proof theory was
suggested as a possible tool in this context in [4], but not pursued per se in that paper.)
124 S.A. Selesnick, G.S. Owen / Journal of Applied Logic 10 (2012) 115–126We brieﬂy recall properties of the exterior algebra E(V ) of a vector space V over the ﬁeld f, assumed for the purposes
of this article to be ﬁnite dimensional, of dimension n, say (cf. [13,25]).
To deﬁne E(V ) for a given V , consider a pair (A, f ) where A is an associative algebra over f, and f a linear map
f : V → A, having the so-called alternating property that f (v)2 = 0 in A for every v ∈ V . Then there exists such a pair
(E(V ), ι) that is universal with respect to this property. That is to say, any linear map f : V → A with A an algebra,
satisfying this alternating property, must factor uniquely through E(V ) via its associated linear map ι : V → E(V ). That is
to say, there must exist a unique algebra map f˜ : E(V ) → A such that f˜ ◦ ι = f . This property determines E(V ) uniquely up
to isomorphisms of associative f-algebras, and one may demonstrate its myriad other properties (which we shall not need






= f ⊕ V ⊕
∧2
V ⊕ · · · (4.1)
with ι : V → E(V ) being given by the obvious embedding, and ∧k denoting the kth exterior product, with ∧0 V := f and∧1 V := V . Elements of the vector space ∧k V are linear combinations of the homogeneous ones, written v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vk , for
vi ∈ V , where ∧ is alternating, that is, v ∧ v = 0 for all v , so that in particular v1 ∧ v2 = −v2 ∧ v1 for all v1, v2 ∈ V . E(V )
becomes an associative algebra with respect to the multiplication obtained by just ∧-ing together homogeneous elements
in the obvious way.
We note that dim
∧k V = (nk
)
, so the series terminates at k = n, ∧n V being one dimensional and dim E(V ) = 2n . In the
case that the base ﬁeld f = R, the ﬁeld of real numbers, and V is a Hilbert space, each ∧k V inherits an obvious Hilbert
space structure and thus so also does E(V ), a structure we now assume to be imposed.
Now, any p dimensional subspace S of V , with basis {v1, v2, . . . , vp} say, determines an element v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vp in ∧p V .
Moreover, if another basis was chosen in S , the corresponding element in
∧p V would be a scalar multiple of v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vp ,
the scalar in question being the determinant of the linear transformation determined by the change of basis. Thus, subspaces
of V determine unique rays in E(V ), which are now regarded as extensions of the corresponding propositions represented
by the subspaces of V , all of which are closed in this ﬁnite dimensional case. The (ﬁnite) “quantum” set analogy is now
apparent: an (orthonormal) set {vi}, say, corresponds to the “elements” of the would-be quantum set and the ray deter-
mined by the exterior product v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vp corresponds to the classical union {v1} ∪ · · · ∪ {vp} despite the discordant and
tortured notational history of these two connectives (which Finkelstein upends by writing ∨ instead of the mathematically
standard ∧, a useful idea which we shall not adopt here). Thus E(V ) represents the family of “quantum subsets” of the
quantum set represented by V , and has the correct dimensionality. In this association, the empty set corresponds to the
unit of the algebra E(V ), namely 1 in the ﬁrst component of Eq. (4.1), and the whole set corresponds to the one dimensional
component
∧n V .
Now, let us suppose we are forced to construct (ﬁnite) sets using this version of set union. The elements of a set
{e1, e2, . . . , en} must then be extracted one by one, construed as vectors, or, strictly, rays (which we shall denote by the same
symbol), and wedged together to obtain ﬁrst e1, then e1∧e2, then e1∧e2∧e3, and so on. If there are no repeats this process
terminates successfully with the production of the vector (ray) representation of the original set, namely e1∧e2∧e3∧· · ·∧en .
However, if there is a repeat, then the process grinds to a halt and the null state, namely the vector 0, is returned: in
forming the vectorial version of a set, repeats are forbidden, and this makes sense since a repeat would be tantamount to
an overcount. The vectorial version of the union of two sets proceeds similarly. (As we have noted the 0 vector does not
represent the empty set, which is represented by 1 in the ﬁrst component of Eq. (4.1), but a true null or quantum falsum.)
This has semantic consequences, if sets are formed cognitively according to this logic. One of these consequences is the von
Domarus principle.
To illustrate this we ﬁrst note that the operation of wedging acts as a “distinguishing” routine or machine: if e1 and e2
are “distinguishable” then their corresponding rays must be different, that is, linearly independent, so that e1 ∧ e2 = 0. If
e1 ∧ e2 = 0 then these elements are indistinguishable, linearly speaking. Thus:
the return of the zero vector signiﬁes identity!
Now, the concept of a thing must be stored as a set of attributes of that thing, which may serve to characterize it to
the extent necessary to make decisions. For instance if the thing is a cannon ball, it may have a (necessarily ﬁnite) set of
essential attributes of the form
{metallic, round, heavy, . . . }
while if the thing is a ping-pong ball it may have a set of essential attributes of the form
{hollow, bouncy, round, . . . }.
S.A. Selesnick, G.S. Owen / Journal of Applied Logic 10 (2012) 115–126 125Let us denote the ﬁrst set by
C := {c1, c2, c3, . . .}.
Then the second set may be denoted by
B := {b1,b2, c2, . . .}.
Now let us suppose our user of this set-making processor comprehends a thing headed toward it, and has to make a
decision as to whether the thing is a cannon ball or a ping-pong ball. That is, a decision must be made as to where, within
the union C ∪ B , its attributes might lie. This requires the construction of this union according to the rules above, namely
the extraction and wedging together of the corresponding vectors. Because of the common attribute c2, namely roundness,
the result returned is of course the zero vector, which signiﬁes identity! Hence a cannon ball is effectively identiﬁed with
a ping-pong ball because they are both round: a shared attribute collapses all the other attributes. This is the von Domarus
principle in action, and the general case should be clear. No further processing is required and the user should duck,
regardless of the circumstance that the speciﬁcation of the approaching missile is incomplete: indeed it behooves the user
not to wait, for example, for a test for heaviness. (If this happens more quickly than the execution of a decision involving
a complete pattern matching procedure using classical set theory, as seems likely, then a selective advantage is seen in the
use of such a procedure. This, and indeed the appearance of a quantum-like logic itself, seems to be entirely consistent with
a less-is-more strategy in the sense of Gigerenzer and Brighton [16], with the return of 0 as a stopping rule.)
5. Conclusions
It is well established that schizophrenic patients are blind to contexts in a very general sense, and tend not to make
logical errors induced by context distraction, unlike normals, who are very prone to them. Moreover, the latter are prone
to such errors because their use of logic seems to involve “heuristics and biases” acquired within the contexts provided by
the environment, “commonsense,” etc. These heuristics etc. seem to be largely correct from the viewpoint of formal logic,
idealized here as PC, when corrected for the errors of context distraction.
Quantum-like logics are those that share key attributes with the logic based upon Hilbert lattices. In this paper we have
argued that even the most minimal of these, namely orthologic, seems to perform well (especially in its intuitionistic or
constructive form) as a template for the logical processing done by schizophrenic patients. (Entanglement may be enabled
by embedding IOL into the self-dual fragment of ILL as noted above.)
Specializing to the subclass of logics based upon ﬁnite dimensional (real) Hilbert lattices, we ﬁnd a quantum version
of set theory occupying a central position. The use of this version of set theory leads to a precise rendition of the von
Domarus principle. The propensity toward making errors of this type seems not to characterize schizophrenia, since these
errors pervade human thinking. (This being said, schizophrenic patients do seem to be prone to making gross errors of this
type, and we shall take this up in a sequel.)
If schizophrenic patients are denied access to the common run of logic as acquired by normals through context driven
experience, where could they be getting their surprisingly uniform logic if not from down below? If this is the case, our
results support the hypothesis that this base logic is indeed quantum-like. “Normal” logic may then arise if entanglement is
allowed in to this base logic and this possibility will be investigated elsewhere.
In a sequel these results will be used to develop further logical tests and to broaden the empirical base.
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